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I. INTRODUCTION
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the United States’ medical
system was predictable. By the time the virus was identified in patients
in the United States, hospitals in northern Italy were already overwhelmed
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with patients with viral pneumonia and acute respiratory distress.1 Patients
were triaged by age and health status to determine who would receive
ventilator therapy and ICU beds.2 Of course, the reach of the virus was
not confined to Italy; after first ravaging China, COVID-19 spread rapidly
in Europe and beyond.3
The COVID-19 pandemic has overwhelmed many U.S. systems—
including the already-strained medical system—intended to protect and
care for its citizens.4 In the United States, New York became the first
epicenter of the pandemic, accounting for approximately five percent of
global COVID-19 cases by March 2020.5 Hospitals, health care providers,
and policymakers soon recognized that, in New York and beyond, they
faced a bleak reality that—if the spread of the virus could not be controlled—
there would soon not be enough ventilators for all patients who needed
them,6 despite hospitals practicing “surge capacity” to reduce the need for
ventilators by canceling or postponing elective procedures that require
ventilators.7 Across the country, alarms continue to be raised about the
potential for insufficient equipment and staff, including ventilators or dialysis

1. See Dan Diamond & Sarah Wheaton, How the US and Italy Traded Places on
Coronavirus, POLITICO (June 22, 2020, 6:03 AM), https://www.politico.eu/article/howthe-us-and-italy-traded-places-on-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/X8HB-A8SU].
2. See Yascha Mounk, The Extraordinary Decisions Facing Italian Doctors,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/whogets-hospital-bed/607807/ [https://perma.cc/5W7S-D5G2]; see also Chiari Mannelli, Whose
Life to Save? Scarce Resources Allocation in the COVID-19 Outbreak, 46 J. MED. ETHICS 364,
364–65 (2020); Andrea Remuzzi & Giuseppe Remuzzi, COVID-19 and Italy: What Next?,
395 LANCET 1225, 1228 (2020).
3. PETE K INROSS ET AL ., R APIDLY I NCREASING C UMULATIVE INCIDENCE OF
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE (COVID-19) IN THE EUROPEAN UNION/EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
AREA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1 JANUARY TO 15 MARCH 2020, at 1 (2020), https://www.
eurosurveillance.org/content/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2020.25.11.2000285 [https://perma.cc/
HQ8Y-JV4Z].
4. Chelsea Janes et al., Surge in Virus Hospitalizations Strains Hospitals in Several
States, WASH. POST (July 8, 2020, 3:40 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
surge-in-virus-hospitalizations-strains-hospitals-in-several-states/2020/07/08/12855e5ec135-11ea-864a-0dd31b9d6917_story.html [https://perma.cc/FX6W-KJSG].
5. Jesse McKinley, New York City Region Is Now an Epicenter of the Coronavirus
Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/22/nyregion/
Coronavirus-new-York-epicenter.html [https://perma.cc/96QZ-2B2Z].
6. Brian Rosenthal & Joseph Goldstein, N.Y. May Need 18,000 Ventilators Very
Soon. It Is Far Short of That, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
03/17/nyregion/ny-coronavirus-ventilators.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pg
type=Article [https://perma.cc/5J6M-UYC7].
7. Lewis Rubinson et al., Definitive Care for the Critically Ill During a Disaster:
A Framework for Optimizing Critical Care Surge Capacity, 133 CHEST (SUPPLEMENT) 18S,
19S, 25S (2008).
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machines, personal protective equipment, necessary drugs or vaccines,
and trained individuals to operate the equipment and treat patients.8
In response to the very real possibility that there will be insufficient
resources to properly respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, states have
been developing crisis standard of care plans.9 These plans often authorize
the prioritization of patients for scarce resources based on changing
circumstances and increased demands.10 They provide a mechanism for
reallocating staff, facilities, and supplies to meet needs during a public
health emergency.11

8.

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HOSPITAL EXPERIENCES RESPONDING
COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL PULSE SURVEY MARCH 23–27
(2020), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-20-00300.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6KK-SETY];
see, e.g., David Matthau, Group Warns: NJ Could Run Low on Covid-19 Drug Remdesivir,
N.J. 101.5 (Aug. 17, 2020), https://nj1015.com/group-warns-nj-could-run-low-on-covid19-drug-remdesivir [https://perma.cc/JT4Z-KPAV].
9. See, e.g., N.Y.C. H EALTH DEP’ T , COVID-19: C RISIS S TANDARDS OF CARE
PLANNING RESOURCES FOR CRITICAL CARE 1 (2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doh/downloads/
pdf/imm/covid-19-critical-care-crisis-planning.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT8B-6JFN].
10. See, e.g., id. at 2.
11. See, e.g., id. at 1–5. In addition to providing guidelines for allocating scarce
resources, like ventilators, during a pandemic, see, e.g., N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE
L AW, N.Y. S TATE D EP ’T OF H EALTH , V ENTILATOR A LLOCATION G UIDELINES (2015),
https://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/reports_publications/docs/ventilator
guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK6F-993W], others have observed additional deviations
from the nonemergency standard of care contained in crisis standards of care:
Physicians are being instructed by their states, professional associations, and
institutions to do things differently, and in ways that may violate the standard of
care if it were not for COVID-19. For example, during cardiac resuscitation some
physicians are being told that all patients must be intubated, rather than using manually
ventilation, like a bag. Intubation reduces the risk of transmitting COVID-19 to
the medical team through the patient’s coughing, but it creates other risks for the
patient, and imposes delays. I have received reports of physicians in some areas
being instructed not to use cardiac catheterization on heart attack patients, due
to risks of physician exposure to COVID-19. Other policies include mandatory
emergency intubation during thrombectomies for people experiencing stroke.
These procedures would ordinarily not involve intubation, but for the risk of
COVID-19 being aerosolized during the procedure. If there is an injury or bad
outcome from the intubation, a patient who did not have COVID-19 may question
the wisdom of intubating them. [¶] In addition to taking extra precautions during
procedures, physicians are also being instructed by their employers to reschedule or
cancel cancer, heart, and lung interventions that they think can wait several weeks.
Teneille R. Brown, When the Wrong People Are Immune, 7 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 10–11
(2020) (footnotes omitted) (citing Data Shows Reduction in U.S. Heart Attack Activations
During COVID-19 Pandemic, CATH LAB DIG. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.cathlabdigest.com/

TO THE
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Although scarce resource allocation protocols vary tremendously from
state to state, they often are based on the principle of saving the most lives
possible.12 As a general rule, they focus on allocating resources solely on
clinical medical criteria, in an effort to avoid making decisions based on
race, gender, age, or other social criteria.13 Overall, these plans should be
made ethically, fairly, and transparently, in order to ensure public trust.
In most instances, these triage protocols are not binding law; rather, they
are state-level guidance that the governor can “trigger” at the time of, or
after, a declaration of emergency.14
II. CALLS FOR LIABILITY PROTECTIONS
In a noncrisis setting, the prevailing medical standard of care focuses
on the needs of each individual patient and is centered on the principle of
informed consent.15 Although the exact language varies across jurisdictions,
under normal circumstances, physicians or surgeons are expected to exercise
“the degree of care and skill that a physician or surgeon of the same medical
specialty would use under similar circumstances.”16 Due to the dearth of
necessary resources and trained professionals during a public health
emergency, the standard of care that clinicians may be able to provide
during the COVID-19 pandemic may, by necessity, depart significantly from
standard nonemergency medical practice.17
Thus, clinicians, health care institutions, and policymakers have expressed
concern about potential legal liability for following crisis standards of
care.18 Adhering to crisis standards of care may expose health care providers
content/data-shows-reduction-us-heart-attack-activations-during-covid-19-pandemic [https://
perma.cc/EUC9-SP36])).
12. John L. Hick & Daniel T. O’Laughlin, Concept of Operations for Triage of
Mechanical Ventilation in an Epidemic, 13 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 223, 225 (2006);
Mannelli, supra note 2, at 365; Rubinson, supra note 7, at 20S.
13. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 11, at 8–9.
14. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 11, at 202,
216. As of July 2020, only one state had “triggered” its crisis standard of care. See Jeremy
Duda, As Covid-19 Worsens, AZ is the First State to Enact ‘Crisis Care’ Standards, ARIZ.
MIRROR (July 3, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://www.azmirror.com/2020/07/03/as-covid-19worsens-az-is-the-first-state-to-enact-crisis-care-standards [https://perma.cc/8EKN-CJVP];
see, e.g., Valerie Gutmann Koch & Susie A. Han, COVID in NYC: What New York Did,
and Should Have Done, 20 AM. J. BIOETHICS 153, 154 (2020).
15. See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 11, at 206.
16. Medical Malpractice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
17. Valerie Gutmann Koch & Beth E. Roxland, Unique Proposals for Limiting Legal
Liability and Encouraging Adherence to Ventilator Allocation Guidelines in an Influenza
Pandemic, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 467, 469 (2013).
18. I. Glenn Cohen, Andrew M. Crespo & Douglas B. White, Potential Legal Liability
for Withdrawing or Withholding Ventilators During COVID-19, JAMA NETWORK (Apr.
1, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2764239 [https://perma.cc/

976

KOCH_57-4 (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 57: 973, 2020]

1/11/2021 3:03 PM

CSCs and Liability Shields
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

and entities to considerable costs and burdens, including the risk of both
civil and criminal liability. For example, health care workers are taking
on significant risk running codes on patients with COVID-19, often without
adequate personal protective equipment.19 Calls for fair treatment of health
care providers20 have led to support for immunity provisions for those who
sacrifice their own well-being in service of the public good.21
Most states have protections in place for unpaid volunteers who provide
care during a declared emergency.22 However, nonvolunteer clinicians,
nurses, and other health care providers may be hesitant to conform to crisis
standards of care—despite their significant public health goals—due to concerns
about liability arising from injury or death. Unless proper and adequate
legal protections are in place, a health care provider risks lawsuits, financial
penalties and jail time, higher medical malpractice insurance rates, and
damage to one’s reputation.23
These concerns are particularly acute where crisis standards of care
recommend ventilator withdrawal without patient consent.24 Some
commentators assert that there may be a legal distinction between withholding
and withdrawing life-sustaining treatments or therapies, such as ventilators,
and note the potential for increased liability concerns with the latter.25
AMH6-8563]; Jeremy Samuel Faust, Make This Simple Change to Free Up Hospital Beds
Now, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2020, 5:07 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2020/03/15/make-this-simple-change-free-up-hospital-beds-now [https://perma.cc/FXT55KR7]; Valerie Gutmann Koch, Govind Persad & Wendy Netter Epstein, Pandemic Guidelines,
Not Changed Malpractice Rules, Are the Right Response to Covid-19, BILL HEALTH (Mar.
30, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/30/pandemic-guidelines-mal
practice-covid19 [https://perma.cc/EF8T-HEVD].
19. See, e.g., Soumya Karlamangla, A Nurse Without an N95 Mask Raced in to
Treat a ‘Code Blue’ Patient. She Died 14 Days Later, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2020, 7:58
AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-10/nurse-death-n95-covid-19patients-coronavirus-hollywood-presbyterian [https://perma.cc/2VR2-5N5H].
20. Caitriona L. Cox, ‘Healthcare Heroes’: Problems with Media Focus on Heroism
from Healthcare Workers During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 46 J. MED. ETHICS 510, 512
(2020) (discussing the principle of reciprocity, which “is of significant importance to
social contract theories: in return for accepting personal risk in fulfilling their duty to treat,
healthcare workers expect reciprocal social obligations”).
21. Brown, supra note 11, at 9, 11.
22. Sara Rosenbaum, Mary-Beth Harty & Jennifer Sheer, State Laws Extending
Comprehensive Legal Liability Protections for Professional Health-Care Volunteers During
Public Health Emergencies, 123 PUB. HEALTH REP. 238, 239 (2008).
23. See Cohen, Crespo & Douglas, supra note 18.
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., id.; Philip D. Levin & Charles L. Sprung, Withdrawing and Withholding
Life-Sustaining Therapies Are Not the Same, 9 CRIT. CARE 230, 230–31 (2005). But see
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Importantly, questions of legal liability for providing care during a
public health crisis predate the COVID-19 pandemic.26 Many argue that
such liability protections may be necessary when, due to the circumstances
of the emergency, a state faces scarce resources and the state activates its
crisis standards of care.27 Thus, lawmakers, policymakers, and professional
societies have called for laws that provide liability shields for care that
may deviate from nonemergency care provided during the pandemic.28
For example, on March 24, 2020, Health and Human Services Secretary
Alexander Azar sent a letter to all state governors, stating, “[f]or health
care professionals to feel comfortable serving in expanded capacities on
the frontlines of the COVID-19 emergency, it is imperative that they feel
shielded from medical tort liability.”29 In doing so, he recommended that
states issue public guidance, “outlining the available liability protections
during the COVID-19 emergency,” and calling on states to “quickly
develop a list of the relevant state liability protections and waivers for
health professionals during a national or state emergency.”30 Likewise,
the American Medical Association recommended that states evaluate
whether their “laws should be extended to fill gaps necessary to address
the potential liability of physicians providing care in response to COVID19 and/or care decisions made based on government or health care facility
COVID-19 directives.”31

Asha Devereaux et al., Summary of Suggestions from the Task Force for Mass Critical
Care Summit, 133 CHEST (SUPPLEMENT) 1S, 6S (2008) (“Rationing should apply equally
to withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatments based on the principle that
withholding and withdrawing care are ethically equivalent.”); Withholding or Withdrawing
Life-Sustaining Treatment: Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 5.3, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://
www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/withholding-or-withdrawing-life-sustainingtreatment [https://perma.cc/G3MR-8BU4] (“While there may be an emotional difference
between not initiating an intervention at all and discontinuing it later in the course of care,
there is no ethical difference between withholding and withdrawing treatment.”).
26. Sharona Hoffman, Responders’ Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public
Health Emergencies, 96 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1926 (2008); Koch & Roxland, supra note 17, at
469.
27. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 11, at 9–11.
28. See, e.g., Letter from Alex M. Azar II, Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., to
Governors 1, 3 (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.ncsbn.org/HHS_Secretary_Letter_to_States_
Licensing_Waivers.pdf [https://perma.cc/DAH6-39H2] [hereinafter Azar Letter].
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id.
31. AM. MED. ASS’N & MED. PROF’L LIAB. ASS’N, COVID-19: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PURSUING LIABILITY PROTECTIONS THROUGH STATE ACTION 1 (2020), https://www.amaassn.org/system/files/2020-04/state-guidance-medical-liability-protections.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NL2L-RZ3V].
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III. EXISTING LIABILITY PROTECTIONS FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
In the United States, states are generally responsible for the regulation
of medical practice.32 Thus, there are no uniform federal rules or guidelines
for how to allocate scarce resources in a public health emergency. As a
result, there is significant variation among states regarding if, and how,
legal liability protections might be provided to physicians, nurses, and
others who provide medical care during a public health emergency. No
uniform legal protection exists for the provision of care under disaster
circumstances or pursuant to state resource allocation guidance.
A. State Laws Granting Liability Protections to Health Care
Providers in the COVID-19 Pandemic
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, many states already had legal rules
or guidance regarding malpractice liability protections for care provided
during a public health emergency in place.33 Various laws provide different
levels of protection: some laws provide civil liability immunity, some provide
both civil and criminal immunity, and some states provide neither.34 Further,
some liability protections are ensured legislatively, through general laws
that protect clinicians from legal liability, absent willful acts or gross
negligence,35 when they provide care pursuant to state directives or crisis
standards of care. Other states have issued executive orders, or rules to
be followed only during the pendency of the emergency.36 In most cases,
executive orders have defined expiration dates—either a date written into
the law or at the termination of a declared emergency.37
32. See, e.g., Azar Letter, supra note 28, at 3 (illustrating the roles of states regulating
their own medical practices with the federal government in an advisory role).
33. Hoffman, supra note 26, at 1937.
34. See id. at 1947–49.
35. Generally, gross negligence is more than just an egregious form of negligence
and can more appropriately be defined as willful misconduct or intentional wrongdoing.
Koch & Roxland, supra note 17, at 474. Gross negligence differs “in kind, not only degree,
from claims of ordinary negligence” and is “conduct that evinces a reckless disregard for
the rights of others or ‘smacks’ of intentional wrongdoing.” See, e.g., Colnaghi, U.S.A., Ltd. v.
Jewelers Prot. Servs., Ltd., 611 N.E.2d 282, 284 (N.Y. 1993) (citing Sommer v. Fed. Signal
Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (1992).
36. See Hoffman, supra note 26, at 1923, 1936, 1947–50.
37. See, e.g., E. Lee Bernick & Charles W. Wiggins, The Governor’s Executive
Order: An Unknown Power, 16 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 3, 6 (1984). It is important to note
that following crisis standards of care that include recommendations for removal of lifesustaining treatment, such as ventilator therapy, from a patient may subject a health care
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As of June 2020, thirty-seven states provide some sort of civil liability
protections for physicians who provided care in a public health emergency.38

provider to liability, even with immunity provisions. See Koch & Roxland, supra note 17,
at 489 (“[A]rguably, immunity-conferring statutes that exempt ‘willful misconduct’ may
not adequately protect health care providers who remove ventilator therapy from a patient
consistent with state-promulgated guidelines. Such an act might be considered to be willful or
in conscious disregard of the safety of the individual harmed and therefore beyond the
protective scope of the law.” (citing Daren P. Mareiniss, Frederick Levy & Linda Regan,
ICU Triage: The Potential Legal Liability of Withdrawing ICU Care During a Catastrophic
Event, 6 AM. J. DISASTER MED. 329, 333 (2011)).
38. ALA. CODE § 31-9-16(b) (2019); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8659(a) (West 2020);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-33.5-711.5(1)–(2) (2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3144 (2020);
IND. CODE § 34-30-13.5-1 (2020); IOWA CODE § 135.147 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48915(b) (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 29:771(B)(2)(c) (2020); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY
§ 14-3A-06 (LexisNexis 2020); MINN. STAT. § 12.61(2)(b) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7325-37 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. 10-3-110(1) (2019); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3082
(McKinney 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.2311 (LexisNexis 2020); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 76, § 5.9 (2020); S.C. CODE A NN. § 44-4-570 (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 20-9-3
(2020); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.007 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 5813-2.6 (LexisNexis 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 20(a) (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01225.02 (2020); WIS. STAT. § 895.4801 (2020); 2020 Ky. Acts 310; S.B. 2640, 191st Gen.
Court, 2019–2020 Sess. (Mass. 2020); S.B. 2333, 219th Leg., S. & Gen. Assemb. (N.J.
2020); 2020 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, § 3D.7.(a); S.B. 3002, 2020 Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Utah
2020); S.B. SF1002, 65th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wyo. 2020); Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-27
(Apr. 9, 2020), https://azgovernor.gov/file/34519/download?token=-CMKhiHH [https://
perma.cc/ RF59-WZ7L]; Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-18 (Apr. 13, 2020), https://governor.
arkansas.gov/images/uploads/executiveOrders/EO_20-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKP9GLRF]; Conn. Exec. Order No. 7V (Apr. 7, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-ofthe-Governor/Executive-Orders/Lamont-Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No-7V.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/5E7X-4MQK]; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01 (Apr. 14, 2020), https://
gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders; Haw. Exec.
Order No. 20-05 (Apr. 16, 2020), https://governor.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
04/2004090-ATG_Executive-Order-No.-20-05-distribution-signed-1.pdf [https://perma. cc/DA6GFBRZ]; Ill. Exec. Order No. 2020-37 (May 13, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/
Executive-Orders/Executiveorder2020-37.aspx [https://perma.cc/5ZEL-N8ZQ] (expired June
27, 2020); Kan. Exec. Order No. 20-26 (Apr. 22, 2020), https://governor.kansas.gov/wpcon`tent/uploads/2020/04/EO-20-26-Executed.pdf [https://perma.cc/GRM9-GRZM]; Mich.
Exec. Order No. 2020-30 (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7387-90499_90705-523481—,00.html [https://perma.cc/M6YE-MYXD] (rescinded); Miss.
Exec. Order No. 1471 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.sos.ms.gov/content/executive orders/
executiveorders/1471.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MA9-SRA8] (rescinded); Nev. Exec. Order
Declaration of Emergency Directive 011 (Apr. 1, 2020), http://gov.nv.gov/News/
Emergency_Orders/2020/2020-04-01_-_COVID-19_Declaration_of_Emergency_Directive_011/
[https://perma.cc/DV5E-D5WK]; N.J. Exec. Order No. 112 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://nj.gov/
infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-112.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9BG-8GYG]; N.Y. Exec.
Order No. 202.10 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/
files/atoms/files/EO_202.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MWV-XK6R] (rescinded Aug. 22,
2020); Okla. Exec. Order No. 2020-13 (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/
executive/1935.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NQG-WD6P]; Pa. Exec. Order to Enhance Protections
for Health Care Professionals (May 6, 2020), https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/05/20200506-GOV-health-care-professionals-protection-order-COVID-19.pdf
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Of those, twenty-one states had promulgated new protections specifically
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.39 Sixteen of those twenty-two
states adopted legal liability protections through executive orders (EOs)
or a directive by the governor, which carries the force of law.40

[https://perma.cc/N4YX-RB8Q]; R.I. Exec. Order No. 20-21 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://
governor.ri.gov/documents/orders/Executive-Order-20-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ2QK5NU]; Vt. Exec. Order No. 01-20, Addendum 9 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.
vermont.gov/sites/scott/files/documents/ADDENDUM%209%20TO%20EXECUTIVE
%20ORDER%2001-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG4V-PR3E].
39.
WIS. STAT. § 895.4801 (2020); 2020 Ky. Acts 310; SS.B. 2640, 191st Gen.
Court, 2019–2020 Sess. (Mass. 2020); 2020 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, § 3D.7(a); SS.B. SF1002,
65th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wyo. 2020); Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-27 (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://azgovernor.gov/file/34519/download?token=-CMKhiHH [https://perma.cc/RF59WZ7L]; Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-18 (Apr. 13, 2020), https://governor.arkansas.gov/
images/uploads/executiveOrders/EO_20-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKP9-GLRF]; Conn.
Exec. Order No. 7V (Apr. 7, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of-the-Governor/
Executive-Orders/Lamont-Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No-7V.pdf?la=en [https://
perma.cc/5E7X-4MQK]; Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01 (Apr. 14, 2020), https://
gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders [https://perma.
cc/2SX8-AHP4]; Haw. Exec. Order No. 20-05 (Apr. 16, 2020), https://governor.hawaii.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2004090-ATG_Executive-Order-No.-20-05-distributionsigned-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA6G-FBRZ]; Ill. Exec. Order No. 2020-37 (May 13, 2020),
https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-Orders/Executiveorder2020-37.aspx [https://
perma.cc/5ZEL-N8ZQ] (expired June 27, 2020); Kan. Exec. Order No. 20-26 (Apr. 22,
2020), https://governor.kansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/EO-20-26-Executed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GRM9-GRZM]; Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-30 (Mar. 29, 2020), https://
www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-523481—,00.html [https://perma.cc/
M6YE-MYXD] (rescinded); Miss. Exec. Order No. 1471 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.
sos.ms.gov/content/executiveorders/executiveorders/1471.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MA9SRA8] (rescinded); Nev. Exec. Order Declaration of Emergency Directive 011 (Apr. 1,
2020), http://gov.nv.gov/News/Emergency_Orders/2020/2020-04-01_-_COVID-19_Declaration
_of_Emergency_Directive_011/ [https://perma.cc/DV5E-D5WK]; N.J. Exec. Order No.
112 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-112.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B9BG-8GYG]; N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.10 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.
ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_202.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MWVXK6R] (rescinded Aug. 22, 2020); Okla. Exec. Order No. 2020-13 (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/executive/1935.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NQG-WD6P];
Pa. Exec. Order to Enhance Protections for Health Care Professionals (May 6, 2020),
https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/20200506-GOV-health-careprofessionals-protection-order-COVID-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4YX-RB8Q]; R.I. Exec.
Order No. 20-21 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.ri.gov/documents/orders/ExecutiveOrder-20-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQ2Q-K5NU]; Vt. Exec. Order No. 01-20, Addendum
9 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.vermont.gov/sites/scott/files/documents/ADDENDUM
%209%20TO%20EXECUTIVE%20ORDER%2001-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG4V-PR3E].
40. Valerie Gutmann Koch, How States are Protecting Health Care Providers from
Legal Liability in the Covid-19 Pandemic, BILL OF HEALTH (May 5, 2020), https://blog.
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Importantly, all applicable laws that provide civil immunity for providing
medical care during an emergency do so conditionally.41 In other words,
if the physician has engaged in willful or intentional misconduct, gross
negligence, recklessness, or has provided care in the absence of good
faith, the physician would still be subject to civil liability.
Only three states—Maryland, New York, and New Jersey—provide
protections to physicians from criminal liability that may result during the
public health emergency.42
B. What Types of Actions Are Covered by States’ Health
Care Provider Liability Shields?
Civil liability protections also vary significantly regarding the types of
actions that are protected. Some states’ liability shields immunize injury
or death that occurs specifically where the health care providers comply
with federal, state, local, or institutional plans, guidelines, or crisis standards
of care. 43 For example, Colorado’s law is tailored to actions taken in
compliance with state crisis standards of care or pandemic-related guidelines,
covering harm that occurs when the health care provider has “compl[ied]
completely with board of health rules regarding the emergency epidemic
and with executive orders regarding the disaster emergency.”44 Although
this law ostensibly provides liability protections for health care providers
who negligently care for both COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 patients, it
is narrow in the sense that it only covers actions taken in compliance with
emergency state rules. Similarly, Minnesota’s law provides immunity to
health care providers if the negligence occurred while the health care provider
was “acting consistent with emergency plans.”45 Texas’s law limits liability
protections to those actions taken “in compliance with orders or instructions
of the department or a health authority.”46 And Wisconsin immunizes health
care professionals providing services during the state of emergency, consistent
with any of the following: “1. [a]ny direction, guidance, recommendation,
or other statement made by a federal, state, or local official to address or
in response to the emergency or disaster” or “2. [a]ny guidance published
petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/05/legal-liability-health-care-covid19-coronaviruspandemic [https://perma.cc/TD8E-V99V]; see sources cited supra note 39.
41. Koch, supra note 40.
42. Id.
43. See Liability Protections for Health Care Professionals During COVID-19, AM.
MED. ASS’N (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/sustainability/
liability-protections-health-care-professionals-during-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/WXX6V9CU].
44. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24- 33.5-711.5(2) (2019).
45. MINN. STAT. § 12.61(2)(b) (2019).
46. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN., § 81.007 (West 2019).
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by the department of health services, the federal department of health and
human services, or any divisions or agencies of the federal department of
health and human services.”47
Some states limit their liability shields to negligent care of patients
specifically diagnosed with COVID-19, for whom the standard of care
may be modified due to scarce resources.48 Pennsylvania grants immunity
to health care professionals “engaged in disaster services activities” but
only for COVID-19-related medical and health treatment or services.49
Rhode Island’s executive order from April 10, 2020 explicitly states
that its law provides no immunity for “negligence that occurs in the course
of providing patient care to patients without COVID-19 whose care has
not been altered by the existence of this disaster emergency.”50 Kentucky
also has narrowly drafted its immunity-conferring provisions, restricting
its protections only to negligent care of patients diagnosed with COVID19, and then clarifying the types of actions the law contemplates.51 The law
provides immunity to health care providers who render care or treatment
of a COVID-19 patient during the state of emergency, including prescription
of medicines for off-label use to attempt to combat the COVID-19 virus
in accordance with the federal Right to Try Act, 52 as long as the health
care provider acts as an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent health care
provider would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.53

47. WIS. STAT. § 895.4801(2)(b) (2019).
48. See Susan Jaffe, As Congress Weighs COVID Liability Protections, States
Shield Health Providers, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 15, 2020), https://khn.org/news/ascongress-weighs-covid-liability-protections-states-shield-health-providers [https://perma.cc/
B2VA-HBGK].
49. Pa. Exec. Order to Enhance Protections for Health Care Professionals (May 6,
2020), https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/20200506-GOV-healthcare-professionals-protection-order-COVID-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV5F-ZFLX].
50. R.I. Exec. Order No. 20-21 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.ri.gov/documents/
orders/Executive-Order-20-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PMV-YREN].
51. 2020 Ky. Acts 310.
52. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to
Try Act, Pub. L. No. 115-176, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018) (largely codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 360bbb-0a).
53. 2020 Ky. Acts 310.
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In contrast, many other states—including Arizona, 54 Arkansas, 55
Connecticut, 56 Iowa,57 Maryland,58 Massachusetts,59 Michigan,60 New
Jersey,61 New York,62 Oklahoma,63 Vermont,64 and Virginia65—provide
54. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-27 (Apr. 9, 2020), https://azgovernor.gov/file/
34519/download?token=-CMKhiHH [https://perma.cc/6FQ6-7JYB] (providing immunity
if the harm occurred providing “medical services in support of the public health emergency”).
55. Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-18 (Apr. 13, 2020), https://governor.arkansas.gov/
images/uploads/executiveOrders/EO_20-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE68-T662] (providing
immunity if the harm occurred providing “medical services in support of the State’s response
to the COVID-19 outbreak or the implementation of measures to control the causes of the
COVID-19 epidemic”).
56. Conn. Exec. Order No. 7V (Apr. 7, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Officeof-the-Governor/Executive-Orders/Lamont-Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No-7V.pdf?
la=en [https://perma.cc/K74X-LJJL] (providing immunity if the harm occurred “providing
health care services in support of the State’s COVID-19 response”).
57. Iowa Exec. Order No. 2020-19 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/
Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-19.aspx [https://perma.cc/SQ6Z-D92Q] (providing
immunity if the harm occurred “in the course of rendering assistance to the State by
providing health care services in response to the COVID-19 outbreak”).
58. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-3A-06 (LexisNexis 2020) (providing immunity
if the harm occurred under a catastrophic health emergency proclamation).
59. S.B. 2640, 191st Gen. Court, 2019–2020 Sess. (Mass. 2020) (providing immunity
if the harm occurred in the course of providing health care services during the period of
the COVID-19 emergency).
60. Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-30 (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/
whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90705-523481—,00.html [https://perma.cc/8Y7K-AZDC]
(rescinded) (providing immunity if the harm occurred “in support of this state’s response
to the COVID-19 pandemic”).
61. N.J. Exec. Order No. 112 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/
pdf/EO-112.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGT4-JG63] (providing immunity if the harm occurred
in the course of providing healthcare services “in support of the State’s COVID-19 response”).
The state’s criminal liability protections are more limited, immunizing providers
and facilities who make scarce resource allocation decisions pursuant to “a scarce critical
resource allocation policy that at a minimum incorporates the core principles identified by
the Commissioner of Health in an executive directive or administrative order.” S.B. 2333,
219th Leg., S. & Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 2020).
62. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.10 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/
no-20210-continuing-temporary-suspension-and-modification-laws-relating-disasteremergency [https://perma.cc/P6E8-8CTP] (rescinded Aug. 22, 2020) (providing immunity
if the harm occurred “in the course of providing medical services in support of the State’s
response to the COVID-19 outbreak”).
63. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 5.9 (2020) (providing immunity if the harm occurred
when the health care provider “renders emergency care, aid, shelter or other assistance during
a natural disaster or catastrophic event”).
64. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 20(a) (2019); Vt. Exec. Order No. 01-20, Addendum
9 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.vermont.gov/sites/scott/files/documents/ADDENDUM
%209%20TO%20EXECUTIVE%20ORDER%2001-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQA5-DA37]
(providing liability protections for emergency management service or response activities).
65. VA . C ODE A NN . § 8.01-225.02 (2020) (providing liability protections for
healthcare providers for the injury or wrongful death of any person arising from “the
delivery or withholding of health care when (i) a state or local emergency has been or is

984

KOCH_57-4 (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 57: 973, 2020]

1/11/2021 3:03 PM

CSCs and Liability Shields
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

civil liability protections for injury or death that occurs due to medical
services that are provided in support of the state’s response to the COVID19 pandemic. This is a much broader level of protection, ostensibly
covering any harms to patients, irrespective of COVID-19 diagnosis or
treatment, as long as the health care provider’s actions were “in support
of the State’s response” to the pandemic.66 In other words, the health care
provider’s actions need not be in accordance with a specific crisis standard
of care or guideline to be protected.
Mississippi’s immunity-conferring provision is similarly broad, immunizing
health care providers for harm that occurs due to care provided “in support
of the State’s COVID-19 response.”67 However, the law also attempts to
clarify this language, stating that the protections include, but are not
limited to, “acts or omissions undertaken because of a lack of resources
attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic that renders the Healthcare
Professional or Healthcare Facility unable to provide the level or manner
of care that otherwise would have been required in the absence of the
COVID-19 pandemic.”68 Like Vermont’s executive order, which also
provides a nonexclusive list of emergency response services,69 Mississippi’s
law could be interpreted to apply to any negligent care that occurs, regardless
of whether it is due to scarce resources or whether the provider is specifically
following a crisis standard of care.
IV. EXISTING LIABILITY PROTECTIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS
Many states have instituted liability protections for institutions, such as
nursing homes and other long-term care facilities.70 Institutional liability
subsequently declared in response to such disaster, and (ii) the emergency and subsequent
conditions caused a lack of resources, attributable to the disaster, rendering the health care
provider unable to provide the level or manner of care that otherwise would have been
required in the absence of the emergency and which resulted in the injury or wrongful
death at issue”).
66. Koch, Persad & Epstein, supra note 18.
67. Miss. Exec. Order No. 1471 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.sos.ms.gov/content/
executiveorders/executiveorders/1471.pdf [https://perma.cc/F47W-FLTL] (rescinded).
68. Id.
69. Vt. Exec. Order No. 01-20, Addendum 9 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.
vermont.gov/sites/scott/files/documents/ADDENDUM%209%20TO%20EXECUTIVE
%20ORDER%2001-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQA5-DA37].
70. Kenneth Yood & Theresa Thompson, Data Reporting, Patient Access and
Malpractice Liability: Nursing Homes and Long-Term Care Facilities Command Federal
and State Attention During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, SHEPPARD HEALTH
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protections certainly are not novel to the circumstances of the COVID-19
pandemic; some states extended civil immunity to nursing homes and
other facilities before 2020, including Indiana,71 Iowa,72 Minnesota,73 and
Virginia.74 As of late June 2020, many states had granted nursing homes
and other long-term care facilities immunity from civil liability, either by
executive order or statute.75 Arizona,76 Connecticut,77 Georgia,78 Hawaii,79
Illinois,80 Indiana,81 Iowa,82 Kansas, 83 Massachusetts, 84 Michigan,85
Minnesota,86 Mississippi,87 New Jersey,88 New York,89 North Carolina,90
L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.sheppardhealthlaw.com/2020/04/articles/corona
virus/ong-term-care-facilities/ [https://perma.cc/S54Y-C5WR].
71. See IND. CODE § 34-30-13.5-3 (2020).
72. See IOWA CODE § 135.147 (2020).
73. MINN. STAT. § 12.61(2)(b) (2019).
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.02 (2020).
75. Nina A. Kohn & Jessica L. Roberts, Nursing Homes Need Increased Staffing,
Not Legal Immunity, HILL (May 23, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/health
care/499286-nursing-homes-need-increased-staffing-not-legal-immunity [https://perma.cc/
L6C9-FHYR]. Professors Nina Kohn and Jessica Roberts evaluated state legal liability
protections, and found that as of late May 2020, nineteen states granted nursing homes
new immunity from civil liability either by executive order or statute. Id. Other states’
liability protections predate this particular public health emergency.
76. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-27 (Apr. 9, 2020), https://azgovernor.gov/file/
34519/download?token=-CMKhiHH [https://perma.cc/6FQ6-7JYB].
77. Conn. Exec. Order No. 7V (Apr. 7, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Officeof-the-Governor/Executive-Orders/Lamont-Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No-7V.pdf?
la=en [https://perma.cc/K74X-LJJL].
78. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.14.20.01 (Apr. 14, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/
executive-action/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders [https://perma.cc/VQ3V-NLVU].
79. See Haw. Exec. Order No. 20-05 (Apr. 16, 2020), https://governor.hawaii.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2004090-ATG_Executive-Order-No.-20-05-distributionsigned-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ47-MKFC].
80. Ill. Exec. Order No. 2020-37 (May 13, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Documents/
ExecOrders/2020/ExecutiveOrder-2020-37.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HQN-QG87] (expired
June 27, 2020).
81. See IND. CODE § 34-30-13.5-3 (2020).
82. See IOWA CODE § 135.147 (2020).
83. Kan. Exec. Order No. 20-26 (Apr. 22, 2020), https://governor.kansas.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/EO-20-26-Executed.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H7G-5UCG].
84. S.B. 2640, 191st Gen. Court, 2019–2020 Sess. (Mass. 2020).
85. See Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-30 (Mar. 29, 2020) (rescinded), https://content.
govdelivery.com/attachments/MIEOG/2020/03/29/file_attachments/1413927/EO%2020
20-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5NN-UJH6].
86. MINN. STAT. § 12.61(2)(b) (2019).
87. Miss. Exec. Order No. 1471 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.sos.ms.gov/Content/
documents/about_us/WhatsNew/1471.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4MT-DXE8] (rescinded).
88. S.B. 2333, 219th Leg., S. & Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 2020).
89. New York Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 3082 (McKinney 2020).
90. 2020 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, § 3D.7(a) (providing immunity for “civil liability for
any harm or damages” caused by acts or omissions in the rendering of health care
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Oklahoma,91 Pennsylvania,92 Rhode Island,93 Utah,94 Vermont,95 Virginia,96
Wisconsin,97 and Wyoming98 all granted civil liability shields to institutions,
including nursing homes, for injury or death that occurs due to negligence
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Just as there is tremendous variation
between the types of actions that health care provider immunity-conferring
laws protect, there is a similar spectrum of protections for health care
institutions, including nursing homes.
Although most state statutes enacted before 2020 only provided civil
immunity to health care providers and not institutions, importantly, almost
half of the laws and executive orders promulgated specifically in response
to the COVID-19 pandemic grant liability protections to both health care
providers and institutions.99 In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a
few states initially provided liability shields solely to health care providers,
only to later amend their rules to grant similar liability protections to health
care institutions.100 For example, until 2020, Wyoming provided immunity
services, if those health care services are impacted directly or indirectly by decisions
made “in response to or as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic” and are provided in
good faith).
91. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 5.9 (2020); S.B. 1496, 57th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2020).
92. Pa. Exec. Order to Enhance Protections for Health Care Professionals (May 6,
2020), https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/20200506-GOV-health-careprofessionals-protection-order-COVID-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGX7-H89P].
93. R.I. Exec. Order No. 20-21 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.ri.gov/documents/
orders/Executive-Order-20-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/5794-GY5N].
94. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-13-2.6 to -2.7 (LexisNexis 2020).
95. Vt. Exec. Order No. 01-20, Addendum 9 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://governor.vermont.
gov/sites/scott/files/documents/ADDENDUM%209%20TO%20EXECUTIVE%20ORDER%
2001-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XNV-48L]; see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 20(a) (2019).
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225.02 (2020) (defining “Health care provider” as “a
person, corporation, facility or institution licensed by this Commonwealth to provide health
care . . .”).
97. WIS. STAT. § 895.4801 (2020).
98. See S.B. SF1002, 65th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wyo. 2020).
99. See, e.g., Miss. Exec. Order No. 1471 (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.sos.
ms.gov/Content/documents/about_us/WhatsNew/1471.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4MT-DXE8]
(rescinded). But see, e.g., Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-18 (Apr. 13, 2020), https://governor.
arkansas.gov/images/uploads/executiveOrders/EO_20-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/CXW7-Q6T6];
Nev. Exec. Order Declaration of Emergency Directive 011 (Apr. 1, 2020), http://gov.nv.
gov/News/Emergency_Orders/2020/2020-04-01_-_COVID-19_Declaration_of_Emergency_
Directive_011/ [https://perma.cc/X29R-ZHVV]. No state has granted immunity provisions to
only institutions and not health care providers.
100. See Randall R. Fearnow et al., COVID-19: Illinois Executive Order Grants Civil
Immunity to Assisted Living Providers, Q UARLES & B RADY LLP (May 11, 2020),
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from liability to “health care provider[s] or other person[s]” who respond
to the public health emergency.101 On May 20, 2020, in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the state amended its existing law, adding “business
entit[ies]” to the those covered by the provision.102
Likewise, New York State’s extension of liability protections to facilities
such as nursing homes and other long-term care facilities is representative
of the lobbying power these institutions have.103 In late March 2020,
Governor Cuomo issued an executive order providing broad civil and criminal
liability protections for health care professionals, including physicians
and nurses, if the injury or death occurred “in the course of providing
medical services in support of the State’s response to the COVID-19
outbreak.”104 However, after “aggressive” advocacy by the Greater New
York Hospital Association (GNYHA),105 language was included in the
state’s annual budget that also provided broad immunity provisions to
nursing homes as well.106
Just like with civil immunity provisions for health care professionals
who provide care during the pandemic, almost without exception, states’
civil immunity provisions for health care institutions exclude willful or
intentional misconduct, gross negligence, recklessness, or the provision
of care in the absence of good faith.
Further, New York107 and New Jersey108 extend criminal immunity to
health care facilities that provide care during the pandemic. However, New

https://www.quarles.com/publications/covid-19-illinois-executive-order-grants-civilimmunity-to-assisted-living-providers/ [https://perma.cc/V3NT-89SD]; Tara Sklar
& Nicolas Paul Terry, States Are Making It Harder to Sue Nursing Homes Over COVID19: Why Immunity from Lawsuits Is a Problem, CONVERSATION (June 9, 2020, 8:19 AM),
https://theconversation.com/states-are-making-it-harder-to-sue-nursing-homes-overcovid-19-why-immunity-from-lawsuits-is-a-problem-139820 [https://perma.cc/VZ2FL5B6]; Laura Strickler & Adiel Kaplan, Nursing Home Industry Pushes for Immunity from
Lawsuits During Coronavirus Emergency, NBC N EWS (Apr. 27, 2020, 3:00 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/nursing-home-industry-pushes-immunitylawsuits-during-coronavirus-emergency-n1192001 [https://perma.cc/B7BT-NNTA].
101. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-4-114(a) (2020).
102. S.B. SF1002, 65th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Wyo. 2020).
103. David Sirota, Cuomo Gave Immunity to Nursing Home Executives After Big Campaign
Donations, G UARDIAN (May 26, 2020), http://theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/26/
andrew-cuomo-nursing-home-execs-immunity [https://perma.cc/3LHM-DG4J].
104. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.10 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/
sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_202.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/33BR-2GL3] (rescinded
Aug. 22, 2020).
105. Sirota, supra note 103.
106. Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 3082 (2020).
107. Id.
108. S.B. 2333, 219th Leg., S. & Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 2020).
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York’s criminal liability protections are broader than New Jersey’s.109
New York’s law seems to allow for more discretion for providers and
facilities, providing criminal liability protections for facilities who
(a) . . . arrang[e] for or provid[e] health care services pursuant to a COVID-19
emergency rule or otherwise in accordance with applicable law; [and] (b) the act
or omission occurs in the course of arranging for or providing health care services
and the treatment of the individual is impacted by the health care facility’s or
health care professional’s decisions or activities in response to or as a result of
the COVID-19 outbreak and in support of the state’s directives.110

In contrast, New Jersey’s criminal immunity provision is limited to
injury or death that occurs “[i]n connection with the allocation of
mechanical ventilators or other scarce medical resources, if the health care
facility . . . adopts and adheres to a scarce critical resource allocation policy
that at a minimum incorporates the core principles identified by the
Commissioner of Health in an executive directive or administrative order.”111
V. WHEN –AND TO WHOM–SHOULD STATES GRANT IMMUNITY?
Immunity provisions are justified, but in limited circumstances. This
Part will (1) propose the most appropriate use of liability shields and (2)
provide support for this proposal.
A. The Proposal
Liability protections are most appropriate in instances where health care
providers—including, but not limited to, physicians and surgeons, nurse
practitioners, nurses, and physicians’ assistants—and, in limited circumstances,
hospitals and other health care institutions, follow, in good faith, state crisis
standards of care. Immunity provisions are appropriate when care is provided
pursuant to local, state, or federal rules, guidance, or protocols that are
modified from the “norm” and necessitated by emergency circumstances.
Blanket provisions providing nursing home immunity are inappropriate.
Rather, we should determine liability protections based on whether (1) the
federal government, state government, local government, professional society,
or medical institution has provided rules, guidance, or crisis standards of
care, elucidating the modifications to the existing standard of care required
109.
110.
111.

Compare PUB. HEALTH § 3082, with N.J. S.B. 2333.
PUB. HEALTH § 3082.
N.J. S.B. 2333.
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during the state of emergency; and (2) there is an identified need to extend
legal protections to providers or institutions, based on perceived reluctance to
follow crisis standards of care intended to save lives, due to fear of liability.
In other words, liability protections are only appropriate when providers
provide care pursuant to rules, guidance, or protocols intended to respond
to the circumstances of the emergency.
Further, immunity provisions should serve the following purposes: they
should (1) have the goal of saving the most lives by ensuring or increasing
bed, equipment, and staffing capacity, and provide the highest standard of
care possible, given the circumstances of the pandemic; (2) avoid placing
blame on providers for events beyond their control, and (3) ensure fair
treatment of frontline health care providers who risk their health and lives
during a public health emergency.
B. The Justification
Although this proposal for liability protections is much narrower than
what many states and some other policymakers have proposed, it is more
likely to ensure accountability and protect vulnerable patients.
Importantly, many legal experts agree that the common law legal standard
of care is adaptable to changing circumstances, and therefore would adjust
to the needs of medical care in a pandemic.112 The standard of care is, by
necessity, flexible. So it is technically unnecessary to provide immunity
for good faith decisions made by institutions or health care providers who
provide care during the pandemic.113 Rather, activating and publicizing

112. Koch, Persad, & Epstein, supra note 18; see, e.g., George J. Annas, Standard
of Care–In Sickness and in Health and in Emergencies, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2126, 2128
(2010); Hoffman, supra note 26, at 1926; Kristi L. Koenig, Hoon Chin Steven Lim &
Shin-Han Tsai, Crisis Standards of Care: Refocusing Health Care Goals During
Catastrophic Disasters and Emergencies, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL MED. 159, 161
(2011) (“Being a flexible doctrine, it is the same regardless of the circumstances—
understood simply as doing what you can under the circumstances, with the patient’s
informed consent.” (citing Annas, supra, at 2126–31)); Kohn & Roberts, supra note 75
(“Conduct that would be negligent in normal times may be permissible during a pandemic.”);
Mark A. Rothstein, Malpractice Immunity for Volunteer Physicians in Public Health
Emergencies: Adding Insult to Injury, 38 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 149, 150 (2010) (“[I]n stark
contrast to suggestions by some ‘altered standards of care’ advocates, the current standard
of care applied to all medical malpractice cases is sufficiently flexible and situationspecific that it need not be altered.”). But see Mareiniss, Levy & Regan, supra note 37
(arguing that relying on the flexibility of the legal standard of care may be inadequate and
therefore special immunities and protections may be required).
113. The standard of care is adaptable to emergency circumstances in non-pandemic
circumstances, particularly in the context of triage decisions. See, e.g., Jonathan Glauser,
Rationing and the Role of the Emergency Department as Society’s Safety Net, 8 ACAD.
EMERGENCY MED. 1101, 1101 (2001); Susan L. Albin et al., Evaluation of Emergency Room
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pandemic response plans and crisis standards of care, which authorize the
prioritization of patients for scarce resources based on their capacity to
benefit from treatment, may be sufficient to provide legal protections for
those who follow such guidelines.114
Despite the relative consensus regarding the legal protections afforded
by the activation or implementation of crisis standards of care, by shifting
the degree of care expected under the circumstances, those who provide
medical care on the frontlines of a public health emergency might remain
concerned about deviating from the nonemergency standard of care.
Consequently, the intention behind immunity provisions for health care
providers who administer care during a pandemic is to encourage frontline
health care providers, when confronted with difficult or seemingly impossible
decisions, to do their best during the worst of circumstances.115 Although
immunity provisions may not be technically required to protect providers
who provide medical care pursuant to crisis standards of care during a public
health emergency, local governments should work to alleviate doctors’ and
other health care providers’ uncertainty about malpractice liability when
providing appropriate medical care to patients during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Not only will laws that provide liability protections potentially encourage
adherence to crisis standards of care in a pandemic, thereby resulting in
more lives saved, we also owe a responsibility to those physicians, nurses,
and other health care providers who risk their own health and lives to save
others.116 Protecting health care providers from legal liability will ostensibly
result in them being more likely to follow crisis standards of care and
saving the most lives possible, without fear of punishment for doing so.
Otherwise, even more people may die.

Triage Performed by Nurses, 65 EMERGENCY ROOM TRIAGE 1063, 1063 (1975) (noting
that, historically, triage has been a common part of emergency care for nurses).
114. Koch, Persad, & Epstein, supra note 18.
115. See Brown, supra note 11, at 9–12 (“This article advocates for removing the
possibility of a medical malpractice claim for individual physicians and independent health
care providers, when they are complying with published state, professional, or institutional
COVID-19 policies in good faith.”).
116. Id. at 12–13 (“Health care providers are under an inordinate amount of stress as
they expose themselves to a serious or deadly disease, often while working incredibly long
hours. The extenuating circumstances of a pandemic necessitate immunity for physicians
who are doing their best to bravely make critical decisions, with imperfect information,
institutional and professional directives that run against the normal standard of care, and
with highly constrained resources.”).
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Thus, because these scarce resource allocation protocols and other crisis
standards of care depart significantly from standard nonemergency medical
practice, it is appropriate that states formalize these plans, thereby providing
some degree of legal protection—perhaps immunity—for following them.117
However, calls for protections for health care providers and institutions,
in order to encourage them to follow modified or crisis standards of care
in emergency circumstances, are being co-opted by politicians and
lobbying groups in an effort to extend legal immunity to those who would
provide substandard care.118 Immunity provisions for nursing homes and
other institutions have been embraced by some proponents as an extension
of protections for frontline “heroes” in the fight against COVID-19.119 For
example, in late April 2020, Senator Mitch McConnell made headlines,
announcing that he would not support the federal stimulus package if
Congress did not include liability protections against COVID-related suits
for businesses, including nursing homes.120
But the justification of encouraging good medical decisions pursuant to
crisis standards of care is not served by the broad provisions contained in
many state laws that provide immunity for all care. Thus, advocacy groups,
patients’ rights advocates, and others have argued that extending liability
protections to long-term care facilities, including nursing homes—which
account for more than half of coronavirus-related deaths121—is at best illadvised, and at worst, deadly. Generally, immunity provisions for nursing
homes are not directed at encouraging providers to follow state guidelines
or crisis standards of care in a public health emergency in order to save
117. Koch, Persad, & Epstein, supra note 18.
118. See id.
119. Debbie Cenziper et al., As Nursing Home Residents Died, New Covid-19
Protections Shielded Companies from Lawsuits. Families Say That Hides the Truth, WASH.
POST (June 8, 2020, 2:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/08/
nursing-home-immunity-laws/ [https://perma.cc/FP9V-7FB8]; Faced with 20,000 Dead,
Care Homes Seek Shield from Lawsuits, FOX 11 NEWS (May 3, 2020), https://fox11online.
com/news/coronavirus/faced-with-20000-dead-care-homes-seek-shield-from-lawsuits-0503-2020 [https://perma.cc/5EHF-PH8K].
120. Siobhan Hughes & Jacob Gershman, Liability Shield Is Next Coronavirus Aid
Battle in Congress, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2020, 6:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
liability-shield-is-next-coronavirus-aid-battle-11588589100 [https://perma.cc/79ZB-5CZP]
(“McConnell . . . has called liability protections a must-have ‘red line’ for Republicans,
saying he won’t support Democrats’ calls for further state and local aid without it.”).
121. In 18 States, Deaths in Long-Term Care Facilities Account for at Least Half of
Their COVID-19 Deaths, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 18, 2020), https://www.kff.org/
coronavirus-covid-19/slide/in-18-states-deaths-in-long-term-care-facilities-account-forat-least-half-of-their-covid-19-deaths/ [https://perma.cc/6NKR-VFS8]. By mid-June, there
were over 50,000 coronavirus deaths in nursing homes in the United States. Coronavirus
Deaths in U.S. Nursing, Long-Term-Care Facilities Top 50,000, FOX BUS. (June 16, 2020),
https://www.foxbusiness.com/healthcare/coronavirus-deaths-in-u-s-nursing-long-termcare-facilities-top-50000 [https://perma.cc/F3YR-ZLD2].
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the most lives; rather, they provide blanket protections institutions who
are often already struggling to adequately serve their residents due to “years
of neglect and chronic underfunding.”122 As a result, even before the
COVID-19 pandemic, many nursing homes did not meet “basic health, safety
and staffing standards.”123 New liability shields—shields that nursing homes
have continuously lobbied for even under nonemergency circumstances—
may immunize institutions from ongoing negligent actions124 that may
have even begun before the pandemic.125
122. Michael Cantor et al., Reducing COVID-19 Deaths in Nursing Homes: Call to
Action, H EALTH A FFAIRS B LOG (May 27, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/
10.1377/hblog20200522.474405/full/ [https://perma.cc/78HD-QVQP].
123. Cenziper et al., supra note 119 (“Watchdog groups say the industry used the
coronavirus emergency to push a longstanding agenda to limit liability and lawsuits.”).
124. “Standards violations in facilities are common. As many as 3 million infections
occur in skilled nursing facilities every year, killing 380,000 residents, according to the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention. Last year, infection control and prevention problems
were the most frequently cited issue at nursing homes, and 63% of nursing homes were
cited for at least one infection control violation in the last two inspection cycles, which go
back to 2016, according to data analyzed by Kaiser Health News.” Abigail Abrams, ‘A
License for Neglect.’ Nursing Homes Are Seeking – and Winning – Immunity Amid the
Coronavirus Pandemic, TIME (May 14, 2020, 2:40 PM), https://time.com/5835228/nursinghomes-legal-immunity-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/SY5Z-NQ85].
125. Faced with 20,000 Dead, Care Homes Seek Shield from Lawsuits, supra note
119 (“What you’re really looking at is an industry that always wanted immunity and now
has the opportunity to ask for it under the cloak of saying, ‘Let’s protect our heroes.’”).
Although “nursing homes are not the only players with troubling safety records predating
COVID,” Jacqueline Stevens, The Problem with Pritzker’s Pandemic Immunity Orders,
CHI. READER (June 12, 2020), https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/pritzker-pandemicimmunity-orders-health-care/Content?oid=80608564 [https://perma.cc/863U-VBCY], this
Article focuses primarily on addressing immunity provisions for nursing homes because
of the high incidence of COVID-19 in nursing homes, the fact that nursing homes often
already struggled to provide adequate care to residents before the pandemic, and nursing
homes are subject to less oversight–both formal and informal–than other health care
institutions. See Bernard Condon & Candice Choi, Nursing Home Outbreaks Lay Bare
Chronic Industry Problems, PBS (Mar. 21, 2020, 11:48 AM), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/health/nursing-home-outbreaks-lay-bare-chronic-industry-problems [https://
perma.cc/V3FB- FZ2Y] (“Burgeoning coronavirus outbreaks at nursing homes in
Washington, Illinois, New Jersey and elsewhere are laying bare the industry’s long-running
problems, including a struggle to control infections and a staffing crisis . . . .”); Ina Jaffe,
Ideal Nursing Homes: Individual Rooms, Better Staffing, More Accountability, NPR (May
21, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/21/855821083/ideal-nursing-homesindividual-rooms-better-staffing-more-accountability [https://perma.cc/GWW5-XKNA]
(explaining that “nursing homes haven’t had to worry about inspectors citing them for
those failings” because of small fines and minimal oversight); Chris Kirkham & Benjamin
Lesser, Special Report: Pandemic Exposes Systemic Staffing Problems at U.S. Nursing
Homes, REUTERS (June 10, 2020, 4:12 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
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During the pandemic, broad institutional immunity provisions remove
the last line of protections for residents; due to scarce resources and the
need to ease some restrictions during emergency circumstances, some
states have already eased institutional oversight.126 Inspections and other
oversight mechanisms have been suspended during the pandemic.127 Visitors
are also restricted during the pandemic, and therefore family members and
friends are unable to check in and help hold facilities accountable if things
appear improper,128 resulting in little to no institutional accountability and

coronavirus-nursinghomes-speci/special-report-pandemic-exposes-systemic-staffingproblems-at-u-s-nursing-homes-idUSKBN23H1L9 [https://perma.cc/GL3D-NZ4T]
(“Insufficient staffing and frequent turnover have caused quality-of-care problems at nursing
homes for decades, studies and government inquiries have shown.”); Richard Mollot,
Nursing Homes Were a Disaster Waiting to Happen, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/opinion/coronavirus-nursing-homes.html [https://perma.cc/
CD8A-79D7] (“The weaknesses in patient care and oversight at nursing homes that made
those deaths more likely were longstanding, widespread and well known.”); Jordan Rau,
Coronavirus Stress Test: Many 5-Star Nursing Homes Have Infection-Control Lapses,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 4, 2020), https://khn.org/news/coronavirus-preparednessinfection-control-lapses-at-top-rated-nursing-homes [https://perma.cc/MCS3-8G77] (“Long
before the novel coronavirus made its surprise appearance, the nation’s nursing homes
were struggling to obey basic infection prevention protocols designed to halt the spread of
viruses and bacteria they battle daily.”); Jordan Rau & Anna Almendraia, COVID-Plagued
California Nursing Homes Often Had Problems in Past, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 4,
2020), https://khn.org/news/covid-plagued-california-nursing-homes-often-had-problems-inpast/ [https://perma.cc/9VFE-R7D6] (“On average, the homes that have had coronavirus
cases had more complaints lodged against them and were fined 29% times more often. In
addition, Medicare also calculated that their health violations of all types were 20% more
serious.”); Maria Sacchetti & Jon Swaine, Wash. Nursing Home Faces $611,000 Fine
Over Lapses During Fatal Coronavirus Outbreak, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2020, 2:51 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/wash-nursing-home-faces-611000-fineover-lapses-during-fatal-coronavirus-outbreak/2020/04/02/757cee76-7498-11ea-87da-77
a8136c1a6d_story.html [https://perma.cc/8FD8-F39M] (“CMS said the facility ‘did not have
effective systems in place’ to prevent the infection or respond to it.”).
126. See Abrams, supra note 124.
127. Id.; see also Nina Kohn, Addressing the Crisis in Long-Term Care Facilities,
HILL (Apr. 23, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/494337-addressingthe-crisis-in-long-term-care-facilities?amp [https://perma.cc/BMU6-4AUV] (“In normal
times, there are three key sources of oversight for nursing homes: state surveyors, ombudsmen
and family members of residents. CMS has now banned visits by family and ombudsmen
except in very limited situations. It has also hobbled surveyors’ efforts by, among other
things, waiving key disclosure requirements related to staffing that are used to assess
compliance with quality of care standards. Even enforcement tools have been deliberately
idled: CMS has suspended enforcement of most regulatory violations by nursing homes,
as well as processes for responding to complaints raised by residents or family members.”).
128. Letter from Am. Ass’n for Justice Nursing Home Litig. Grp. et al., to Mitch
McConnell, Majority Leader, U.S. Sentate, & Charles Schumer, Minority Leader, U.S.
Senate (May 28, 2020), https://theconsumervoice.org/uploads/files/issues/senateleadership
immunityltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMP2-TY7Q].
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eliminating the deterrent effect of the law.129
Opponents of broad institutional immunity provisions argue that because
nursing homes are already a major source of negligence in normal times,
immunity provisions will excuse regularly-occurring negligence based on
the state of emergency.130 Thus, they advocate that “troubled facilities ought
to remain subject to litigation resulting from life-threatening failures in
infection control and patient care, and families offered a chance to pierce
the layers of secrecy that often surround unexpected or unexplained deaths.”131
In essence, many institutional liability provisions cover actions that are
not taken in furtherance of the state’s response to the circumstances of the
pandemic. Thus, as one article explained, nursing homes should continue
to be held accountable for negligent behavior.132 Among those that should
be held accountable are
Homes that flouted federal guidelines to screen workers, cut off visitations and
end group activities; those that failed to inform residents and relatives of an
outbreak; those that disregarded test results; and homes like one in California,
where at least a dozen employees did not show up for work for two straight days,
prompting residents to be evacuated.133

Thus, immunity provisions are really only appropriate when they are
intended to encourage adherence to crisis standards of care—institutional
or state guidelines that depart from ordinary standards of care but are

129. Stevens, supra note 125 (“‘The deterrence value from the threat of litigation is
part of what you’re losing due to the EO, even if at the end of the day certain cases are
viable in court,’ Kohn explained.”). But see Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan,
Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1595, 1598 (2002) (finding some, but limited, evidence of the deterrent effect of
malpractice litigation on medical errors); Nathaniel Hupert et al., Processing the Tort
Deterrent Signal: A Qualitative Study, 43 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1, 1 (1996) (identifying potential
“impediments to the receipt and processing of the tort deterrent signal by individual
physicians” and calling for institutional liability).
130. See Cenziper et al., supra note 119.
131. Id. Further, Kohn and Roberts argue that existing liability protections may be
sufficient to protect nursing homes from lawsuits. Kohn & Roberts, supra note 75 (“This
rhetoric exaggerates the industry’s vulnerability to litigation. Even without legal immunity,
COVID-19 could ravage a nursing home—killing most residents—without the facility being
liable. This is because, consistent with established tort law doctrines, facilities that operate
reasonably are unlikely to be liable for COVID-19 related harms, including residents’
deaths.”).
132. See Faced with 20,000 Dead, Care Homes Seek Shield from Lawsuits, supra
note 119.
133. Id.
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intended to save lives during the pandemic.134 Although this proposal may
not provide immunity to health care providers or institutions in circumstances
where they are simply overwhelmed by the number of cases presenting at
a given moment, the state has not provided guidelines or rules for addressing
that particular situation. In such circumstances, the inherent flexibility of
the standard of care should sufficiently protect providers and institutions
who do their best in the worst of situations from liability, while also allowing
patients and their loved ones to seek recourse for injuries or deaths that
occur due to poor decision-making.
Rather than encouraging nursing homes to provide the best care possible
under difficult circumstances, predicating readmission of residents after
hospitalization for COVID-related care on liability shields135 holds legislators
and policymakers hostage. In such cases, immunity provisions for institutions
like nursing homes—which are often for-profit—do not protect the health
care providers themselves who do their best to care for individuals with
fewer resources, nor do they protect residents.136
Further, even during a declaration of emergency, at times viral spread
may become controlled and hospitals may experience less resource scarcity.
At those times, health care providers and entities will be able to provide
care at the “normal” nonemergency standard of care. Thus, broad protections
that are in effect during the entire duration of the pandemic shield physicians
and health care institutions from liability even in instances where those
providers and institutions could have provided care pursuant to nonemergency
circumstances.
This proposal does not exclude all nursing homes from liability shields
in all circumstances. Rather, where institutions follow crisis standards of
care intended to protect their residents and save lives, immunity provisions
may be appropriate. For example, experts have called for various innovations
intended to reduce deaths due to COVID-19 in nursing homes. 137
134. See, for example, New Jersey’s law, which limits criminal immunity to injury
or death that occurs due to adherence to a crisis standard of care governing the allocation
of mechanical ventilators or other scarce medical resources. S.B. 2333, 219th Leg., S. &
Gen. Assemb. (N.J. 2020).
135. See Stevens, supra note 125 (Nursing home’s CEO’s e-mail to Illinois Governor’s
chief of staff “implied [nursing home’s] facilities would refuse readmittance of their own
residents following hospital COVID care unless ‘litigation relief’ were ordered.”).
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., Cantor et al., supra note 122 (offering Massachusetts’ initiatives as a
model, and recommending “1) enhancing infection control with an individualized plan for
each nursing home that incorporates both regulatory guidance and current literature and is
feasible to implement; 2) ensuring necessary resources to implement infection control plans,
especially adequate staff, training, personal protective equipment (PPE), COVID-19 testing,
creation of units for COVID-19 positive patients, and access to onsite ancillary services (labs,
imaging, intravenous (IV) management); 3) mirroring the federal Coronavirus Commission for
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Conditioning institutional immunity on following guidance intended to
protect residents would justify liability protections.138 Finally, instead of
providing broad institutional immunity to these already-underfunded and
understaffed institutions,139 thereby almost completely insulating providers
from liability, sufficient resources and support should be afforded so that
they can provide the best care possible during difficult times.
Thus, blanket immunity-conferring laws provide liability shields for
decisions made that may have no connection to resource allocation due to
COVID-19, but rather may simply protect an institution or individual health
care provider behaving negligently. In such cases, immunity provisions
remove the last thing that keeps institutions accountable.

Safety and Quality in Nursing Homes by establishing state-level task forces focused on
improving communication and collaboration between nursing homes and families, health
care providers (hospitals, health systems, home health agencies, physician organizations),
and government agencies”); see also Jaffe, supra note 125 (providing “innovating ideas”
from “[l]ong-time nursing home analysts”); Kohn, supra note 127.
138. See Abrams, supra note 124.
139. Kohn & Roberts, supra note 75.
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